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The ‘Crime-driven Lens’ and Its Blind Spots
Aldo Zammit Borda*
Abstract
While the question of whether international criminal courts and tribunals (ICTs)
ought to write historical narratives of armed conflicts is an old one, it has gained
renewed relevance in the context of the recent turn to history in international crim-
inal law and the minimal attention paid to historical context in the first judgment of
the International Criminal Court. The ‘proper’ place of history-writing in internation-
al criminal adjudication remains controversial, and even though some judges have
preferred to de-emphasize it, the fact remains that ICTs are epistemic engines, sys-
tematically and inevitably producing knowledge about the conflicts that come before
them. This article develops a framework for analysing the historical knowledge
generated by ICTs, namely, the ‘crime-driven lens’. It argues that this lens is char-
acterized by two important constraints, one qualitative, relating to interpretation and
the other quantitative, relating to scope, both of which may give rise to blind spots.
In the final analysis, while the important contributions of ICTs to deepening under-
standing of the histories of armed conflicts should not be underestimated, the con-
straints of the ‘crime-driven lens’ and its blind spots have to be taken into account
when assessing their historical legacies.
1. Introduction
At least since the trials of Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg, commentators
have asked whether criminal courts ought to write historical narratives of an
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armed conflict.1 While the question is not new, it has gained renewed rele-
vance in the context of the recent turn to history in international criminal law
(ICL), the growing attention to the historical legacies of the ad hoc Tribunals
since their closure, and the minimal attention paid to historical context in the
first judgment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).2
The debate over the extent to which mass atrocity trials should have a
history-writing function was brought to the fore during the 1961 Eichmann
trial in Israel, when Hannah Arendt famously drew attention to the question
in her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.3 Since
Arendt articulated her doctrine of strict legality, in response to what she
perceived as the excesses of the prosecutor’s expansive historical approach,
the scholarly debate on the subject has been largely polarized between restrict-
ive and expansive approaches to history-writing in such trials. On the one hand,
Arendt’s restrictive doctrine, which has been characterized as a ‘justice-and-
nothing-else’ doctrine, dominated early discussions of the subject and contin-
ues to resurface repeatedly.4 On the other hand, however, a growing number
of scholars have identified the distinction between legal and extra-legal aims as
unnecessary and limiting.5 Scholars in this camp have characterized strict
legality as ‘crabbed and needlessly restrictive’,6 and have argued that mass
atrocity trials should actively seek to shape collective memory and maximize
their pedagogic impact.7
The question over the proper approach to history-writing in international
criminal adjudication continues to be a source of controversy today. Given that
the primary function of international criminal courts and tribunals (ICTs)
remains the determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, some
judges (and other legal practitioners) have taken the view that a concern with
history-writing could only, as Arendt had argued, detract from that function.
They have, as a consequence, sought to de-emphasize their history-writing
role. However, even if the history-writing role is backgrounded, the fact
remains that ICTs are epistemic engines: that is, they are institutions that sys-
tematically and inevitably produce knowledge or find truths about the
conflicts that come before them.8 The question over the proper approach to
1 R.A. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University Press, 2011),
at viii–ix.
2 Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber,
14 March 2012, §§ 41–49. Just 9 of the 593 pages of the Lubanga trial judgment are devoted
to describing the historical context in which the crimes were committed.
3 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Publishing Group,
1992).
4 F. Gaynor, ‘Uneasy Partners — Evidence, Truth and History in International Trials’, 10 Journal
of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2012) 1257, at 1257.
5 N. Tromp, Prosecuting Slobodan Milošević: The Unfinished Trial (Routledge, 2016), at 18.
6 L. Douglas, ‘The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom’, 14 European
Review (2006) 513, at 514.
7 M.J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (Transaction Publishers, 1999), at 3.
8 J.v.H. Holtermann, ‘‘‘One of the Challenges That Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’’? On
the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals’, in
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history-writing, therefore, cannot be escaped. In this context, there is often a
tension between the diverging priorities that ICTs seek to address: ‘to tell the
whole truth and to create a historical record, while adhering to jurisdictional
and evidentiary rules which restrict that process’.9 While previous works of
scholarship in this area have identified various jurisdictional concepts and
procedural rules which affect and constrain the production of historical
narratives in international criminal trials,10 this article develops a particular
framework through which ICTs interpret past events and generate truth: the
‘crime-driven lens’.11
ICL’s focus on proscribing certain categories of criminal conduct and ascrib-
ing criminal liability significantly constrains the questions that judges and
other actors involved in international criminal proceedings are able to ask
and tends to limit broader narratives about a given armed conflict.12 This
narrow focus on criminal conduct and criminal liability may be characterized
as ‘crime-driven’. Adopting the ‘crime-driven lens’ means that other dimen-
sions of a conflict, unrelated to criminal liability, but which would be of un-
questionable historical importance — such as legitimate combat not involving
crimes, peace negotiations, and efforts to ensure humanitarian relief — are
often irrelevant to both the prosecution and the defence.13 As a result, these
dimensions of a conflict, while historically significant, may never so much as
get mentioned in trial narratives because they are essentially irrelevant for the
purposes of determining criminal liability.14
N. Hayashi and C.M. Bailliet (eds), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (Cambridge
University Press, 2017), at 207.
9 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1258.
10 See, inter alia, Wilson, supra note 1; Gaynor, supra note 4.
11 In this respect, the article adopts a cognitive approach to look into the frames used by inter-
national judges: see B. Pirker and J. Smolka, ‘The Future of International Law Is Cognitive—
International Law, Cognitive Sociology and Cognitive Pragmatics’, 20 German Law Journal
(2019) 430, at 436. The ‘crime-driven lens’ is just one framework through which international
judges perceive historical events. In international criminal adjudication, this framework is usu-
ally complemented by others, including a focus on individual agency (the individual-centred
lens) and a faith in law as a force for good (the law-affirming lens). Through the juxtaposition
of these lenses, and the constraints on history-writing that they entail, international judges are
usually only able to produce ‘trial’ truths that are distinctly-legal. For a more extensive dis-
cussion of this issue, see A. Zammit Borda, The Historical Narratives of International Criminal
Tribunals and Their Blind Spots: Building a Responsible History Framework (Springer/TMC Asser,
forthcoming).
12 A. Cassese, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), at 3; R. Cryer
and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University
Press, 2007), at 18.
13 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1264. The point here is to highlight the limits of the crime-driven lens
and the scope of past events considered to be ‘relevant’ from the perspective of this lens. It is
not to suggest that the focus of ICTs should be broadened to such matters as humanitarian
relief.
14 W. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals
(Oxford University Press, 2012), at 160.
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This article explores the features of the ‘crime-driven lens’ and its implica-
tions for the production of historical narratives by ICTs. As such, this study is
related to a line of recent work concerned with legal epistemology, pursued by
scholars who are attempting to establish this field as a new sub-discipline in
the philosophy of law at the crossroads between the law of evidence and
philosophical epistemology.15 The adoption of such lens is characterized by
two important constraints, one qualitative relating to interpretation and the
other quantitative relating to scope, both of which may give rise to blind spots.
In this context, Hirsch observes that international tribunals produce very dis-
tinct kinds of historical narratives, which have to be interpreted and selected by
those courts and tribunals.16 This article will examine how ICTs interpret
historical events from a specific legal prism, which may be quite different
from interpretations of the same events in other disciplines. While the
‘crime-driven lens’ is useful in focusing attention on the implications of differ-
ent interpretations, an important limitation of the framework is that it is not
able to account for why judges, in particular cases, may prefer particular
interpretations. It will then analyse the implications of external and internal
exclusions for the historical narratives that ICTs may write. Again, while the
merit of the ‘crime-driven lens’ is to draw attention to the implications of these
exclusions for the historical narratives, an important limitation is that the
framework is unable to explain the motivations behind such exclusions.
2. Outlining the ‘Crime-driven Lens’
A. Constraints Relating to Interpretation
Law generally, and criminal law in particular, contains a number of distinct
legal constructs, some of which diverge markedly from the ‘ordinary’ under-
standings of similar terms, and which compel judges to view past events from
specific lenses. Moreover, at trial, judges are called on to interpret these con-
structs, and their judicial interpretations may further influence how historical
evidence is approached in the case at hand and, therefore, how past events are
ultimately represented in their narratives. Wilson observes that ‘[l]aw’s unique
conventions, special categories, and exceptional rules impel courts to perceive
historical events through a counterintuitive prism, which leads to all manner
of unintended consequences and absurd outcomes’.17 And Damaška notes that
whereas other intellectual pursuits thrive on plural, often ambiguous mean-
ings, law usually insists on a single, fixed (and potentially artificial) perspec-
tive.18 Law is not unusual in this regard, as other disciplines and epistemic
communities have their own peculiar conventions and concepts. However,
what is different about law is that it is intended for external consumption
15 Holtermann, supra note 8, at 212.
16 M. Hirsch, Invitation to the Sociology of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), at 53.
17 Wilson, supra note 1, at 8.
18 M. Damaška, ‘Truth in Adjudication’, 49 Hastings Law Journal (1998) 289, at 293.
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far beyond the legal community, where such legal constructs and conventions,
assessed against non-legal standards, may seem absurd.
As will be discussed in this section, legal constructs often promote distinctly
legal interpretations (or, in some cases, distortions) of past events either be-
cause of the specific framing of particular concepts on the statute books, which
may differ markedly from the ‘ordinary’ meanings of such concepts, or because
of the specific judicial interpretations at trial. The ‘crime-driven lens’ is useful
in that it draws attention to this phenomenon and its implications for the
ensuing historical narratives and their blind spots.
Many of the legal concepts and modes of criminal liability contained in the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg have come
under considerable scrutiny. This is particularly so with respect to the concept
of ‘conspiracy’, which Bloxham refers to as the ‘tyranny of a construct’,19 as
well as the then innovative concept of ‘crimes against humanity’, which was
developed, inter alia, following pressure to expand the definition of existing legal
concepts in the light of revelations about the systematic massacres in eastern
Europe.20
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter provided that crimes against humanity,
which included murder, extermination and enslavement, were crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal so long as they were committed ‘in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal’.21 This technical language essentially meant that crimes against hu-
manity were not autonomous and could only fall within the jurisdiction of the
court if committed in connection with crimes against the peace and/or war
crimes. The drafters of the Charter may have decided to link war crimes with
crimes against humanity to counterweigh the controversial status of crimes
against humanity as an innovative international crime at the time.22 However,
the requirement for this linkage had the perverse effect of compelling the
prosecution and the judges to focus on crimes committed after 1939 and,
consequently, of cutting short their assessment of the vast crimes occurring
before the war began, such as the extermination of German nationals in
German concentration camps before 1939.23 On this point, the Nuremberg
Tribunal famously concluded that pre-war atrocities did not fall within its
jurisdictional competence:
19 D. Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and
Memory (Oxford University Press, 2003), at 69. See also G. Simpson, ‘Linear Law: The History
of International Criminal Law’, in C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal
Law (Routledge, 2015) 159, at 168.
20 Bloxham, supra note 19, at 18.
21 Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’).
22 The Allies also sought to avoid precedents that could apply to them: J. Fuchs and F. Lattanzi,
‘International Military Tribunals’, in F. Lachenmann and R. Wolfrum (eds), The Law of Armed
Conflict and the Use of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2017) 544, at 550.
23 Ibid.






/jicj/article/18/3/543/5900361 by guest on 11 February 2021
[t]he policy of persecution, repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of
1939 . . . was most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the same period is
established beyond all doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on
before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or in connection with, any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting
and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they
were done in execution of, or connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore
cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were Crimes against
Humanity within the meaning of the Charter.24
Douglas argues that by holding that only those crimes against humanity
committed in connection with criminal war of aggression or war crimes were
justiciable, the Tribunal radically restricted the reach of 6(c). Suddenly atroc-
ities committed by the Nazi government against its own civilians — precisely
those offences targeted by the Charter’s seemingly ambitious notion of crimes
against humanity — could be brought into the IMT’s jurisdiction only if they
had been committed in connection with the planning or waging of a war of
aggression or other war crimes.25 From the perspective of historical represen-
tation, therefore, the link requirement of the Charter, as interpreted and
applied by the Nuremberg judges, gave rise to significant blind spots in the
historical narratives emerging from that Tribunal.
Importantly, the restrictive interpretation of the link requirement favoured
by the Nuremberg judges was only one of a number of possible interpretations
supported by the language of Article 6 of the Charter. It was not, however, the
only possible interpretation. Indeed, Article 6(c) of the Charter expressly
included crimes against humanity committed ‘before or during the war’.
However, the judges at Nuremberg chose to de-emphasize this element and
to place greater emphasis on the link requirement, hence adopting a more
restrictive interpretation of crimes against humanity. This approach resulted
in a narrower application of crimes against humanity which, as noted above,
resulted in the omission of acts that occurred before 1939.26 This indicates
that, while legal constructs contained in the frameworks of particular ICTs do
exert limitations on the possible interpretations of historical facts, such con-
structs per se remain adaptable and potentially open to competing interpreta-
tions. While the ‘crime-driven lens’ is useful in focusing attention on the
implications of different interpretations for the ensuing historical narratives,
this framework is not able to explain why judges, in particular cases, may
prefer particular interpretations. Such preferences would have to be explained
by reference to other theories (such as theories of judicial decision-making).
While some legal constructs resemble more closely the ‘ordinary’ or scientific
understandings of a particular concept, others diverge significantly from those
understandings. The reasons for such divergences may vary: in the case of
24 Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
14 November 1945–1 October 1946, Vol. 22 § 498.
25 L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (Yale
University Press, 2005), at 48–49; Bloxham, supra note 19, at 62.
26 See Fuchs and Lattanzi, supra note 22, at 550.
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constructs developed in the international arena, for instance, these may have
been subjected to several rounds of negotiations and political compromises,
resulting in distinctly legal constructs. It is usually the constructs that diverge
most significantly from the ordinary or scientific understandings of a concept
that have most potential to distort historical interpretations. Social scientists
have described these as having the effect of ‘torturing’,27 ‘deforming’28 or
‘distorting’29 history. This was the case with respect to the limiting language
around crimes against humanity in the IMT Charter and, as will be discussed
below, the distinctive definition of the crime of genocide.
The definition of the crime of genocide, as enshrined in Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention of 1948, departs significantly from ‘genocide’ as it exists
in the public imagination.30 Milanović observes that ‘there is a marked differ-
ence between the ordinary, lay meaning of the word ‘‘genocide’’, or even the
concept of genocide in anthropology or other social sciences, and the legal
concept of genocide’.31 One major area of divergence relates to the omission
of political and other groups from the list of protected groups in the crime of
genocide.32 By excluding political and other groups, the definition, which was
the result of several political compromises,33 could give rise to the situation
whereby, for instance, the killing of 8,372 men and boys in Srebrenica may be
legally categorized as (ethnic) genocide,34 while the massacre of over a million
in Cambodia may not, because such massacres concerned social, economic or
political groups not covered by the definition.35 This in turn could give rise to
significant blind spots in the narratives produced by ICTs, in that, mass atroc-
ities potentially involving millions of people may legally not be considered
genocide at all (though they could be categorized as crimes against human-
ity/war crimes). These limitations of the legal construct of genocide have led
some social scientists to discard it altogether and to ask: ‘to what extent is it
legitimate to adopt an international legal norm resulting from a political
27 Douglas, supra note 25, at 76.
28 Simpson, supra note 19, at 168.
29 Wilson, supra note 1, at 9.
30 United Nations Human Rights Council and Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘‘‘They Came to Destroy’’: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’ (2016)
A/HRC/32/CRP.2, para. 13.
31 M. Milanović, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’, 17 European Journal of International Law
(2006) 553, at 556.
32 B.V. Schaack, ‘The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind
Spot’, 106 The Yale Law Journal (1997) 2259; S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, Accountability for
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford University
Press, 2001), at 44.
33 See W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes (Cambridge University
Press, 2000), at 51.
34 Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, § 594.
35 W.A. Schabas, ‘Problems of International Codification - Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and
Kosovo Genocide Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Panel
Two: Problems of International Codification’, 35 New England Law Review (2000) 287, at
292. Determining the precise number killed is difficult for Cambodia: see R.J. Rummel,
Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (LIT Verlag Münster, 1998), at 4.
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compromise between states as a basis for historical, sociological or anthropo-
logical inquiry?’36
It is important to emphasize, at this stage, that legal constructs, even if
seemingly artificial to ‘outsiders’, perform an important function in the process
of legal adjudication. Schauer argues that such legal constructs have to be
seen in the context of law as a rule-based and an exclusionary system.37 Law
itself, more than morality, or history, or even everyday common-sense reason-
ing, is an exclusionary system. By treating certain legal constructs as authori-
tative (and thus obligatory) even when, to an external audience, they may
seem to generate suboptimal outcomes, the legal system does its work by
taking off the table factors and reasons that an ideal and unconstrained
decision-maker would treat as relevant. Thus, a central feature of law is its
rule-based commitment to instructing its decision-makers that not everything
they believe material to making ‘the best all-things-considered decision is
something they can take into consideration when making a legal decision’.38
And it is this rules-based commitment that, in part, enables the narratives of
ICTs to be regarded as authoritative. Moreover, Damaška argues that the nar-
row framing of legal constructs has the advantage of focusing inquiries ‘on
narrow aspects of reality in regard to which the potential for controversy is
greatly reduced’.39
Legal constructs, therefore, have an important role to play in a rule-based
and exclusionary system such as law, and their use is valuable in constraining
decision-makers and safeguarding the legitimacy of the adjudicative process.
However, given that judges (and other legal practitioners) are obliged to in-
terpret historical facts through such constructs and, in particular, to make
determinations as to what historical evidence is relevant or not, such con-
structs have the potential to have a distortive effect on the interpretation of
past events, particularly when they diverge significantly from the ‘ordinary’ or
scientific understandings of a term.
While the discussion so far has tended to highlight the rigidities of law’s
crime-based lens, it is important to note that law is also able to innovate and
develop new legal categories to reflect novel or changing realities and, poten-
tially, to bridge blind spots. After all, the concepts of crimes against humanity
and genocide were innovations adopted in response to the atrocities of WWII.
Bilsky argues that ICL has been able to develop innovative legal categories to
accommodate novel situations: thus for example, ‘the trials had to develop
innovative interpretations of new legal concepts such as ‘‘collaboration,’’
‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ ‘‘universal jurisdiction,’’ ‘‘manifestly illegal order,’’
36 J. Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (Hurst & Co Publishers
Ltd, 2014), at 321. This has however given rise to a plurality of definitions of genocide in the
social sciences: see ibid.
37 F. Schauer, ‘In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law–and Epistemology Too1’, 5 Episteme (2008)
295, at 300.
38 Ibid., at 301.
39 Damaška, supra note 18, at 293.
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and so on’.40 And ICL continues to evolve and to develop new legal constructs,
such as in the areas of sexual and reproductive violence. Indeed, as Jarvis and
Nabti observe, when the ICTY prosecution began to focus more on conflict-
related sexual violence crimes, there was very little concerning sexual violence
in ICL.41 Early cases establishing today’s well-worn precedents — such as
recognition of sexual violence as torture and enslavement — initially required
a leap of faith by the prosecution.42 Today, however, legal constructs concern-
ing such violence have become firmly embedded in modern ICL.
At trial, judges could further seek to recalibrate the scope of such legal
constructs, by broadening or narrowing them through judicial interpretation,
which in turn would have implications for the historical narratives and their
blind spots. Judges of ICTs have shown a willingness, in certain cases, to use
interpretive methodologies to adapt particular legal concepts to the novel sit-
uations before them.43 Indeed, Shklar argues that law is more creative than its
practitioners like to admit.44 A case in point is the ICTR’s application of the
definition of genocide to the situation in Rwanda. In Akayesu, the Trial
Chamber was faced with the predicament of applying the legal concept of
genocide and, in particular its protected groups definition, to the Tutsis, who
did not exist as a separate ethnic group, as all Rwandans spoke the same
language and shared the same cultural and religious traditions.45 The
Chamber framed its predicament as follows:
the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, echoed
in Article 2 of the Statute, should be limited to only the four groups expressly mentioned
and whether they should not also include any group which is stable and permanent like the
said four groups. In other words, the question that arises is whether it would be impossible
to punish the physical destruction of a group as such under the Genocide Convention, if the
said group, although stable and membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of any
one of the four groups expressly protected by the Genocide Convention.46
Had the judges of the ICTR Trial Chamber adopted a strict legal interpret-
ation, they would have had to answer the question in the affirmative — it was
not possible to punish the physical destruction of a group if that group did not
meet the definition of protected groups under the definition of genocide. Had
40 L. Bilsky, Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial (University of Michigan Press, 2004), at
12.
41 M. Jarvis and N. Nabti, ‘Policies and Institutional Strategies for Successful Sexual Violence
Prosecutions’, in S. Brammertz and M. Jarvis (eds), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
(Oxford University Press, 2016) 73.
42 M. Jarvis, ‘Overview: The Challenge of Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
Crimes’, in S. Brammertz and M. Jarvis (eds), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
(Oxford University Press, 2016) 9.
43 B. Sander, ‘The Method is the Message: Law, Narrative Authority and Historical Contestation in
International Criminal Courts’, 19 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2018) 299.
44 J.N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard University Press, 1986), at 151–
170. See also R. Vernon, ‘What Is Crime against Humanity?’ 10 Journal of Political Philosophy
(2002) 231, at 232.
45 Wilson, supra note 1, at 175.
46 Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998 § 516.
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they stopped there, they would therefore have had to conclude that genocide
had not occurred in Rwanda, giving rise to significant lacunae in the
Tribunal’s historical narratives on the Rwandan violence. However, they
kept alive the idea that the Tutsi were a protected group by taking an innova-
tive turn, arguing that: ‘although the Tutsi did not qualify straightforwardly as
an ethnic or racial group under the terms of the Genocide Convention, per-
manent membership in the group was conferred both by the Rwandan state
(in the form of ID cards and birth certificates) and Rwandan society (through
conventions of patrilineal descent)’.47 This broader interpretation of the legal
grid concerning genocide, which Alvarez describes as ‘postmodern’,48 went on
to influence other legal assessments of mass violence.
It could be argued that, by interpreting this legal construct broadly to find
that Tutsis constituted a protected group, the judges in Akayesu exerted a
‘corrective’ interpretation on the legal construct, bringing it more in line
with the ‘ordinary’ understanding of genocide as it exists in the public imagin-
ation.49 This broad interpretation, in turn, had significant implications for
determinations of relevance or irrelevance of historical evidence admitted at
trial and, ultimately, for the historical narratives on genocide that ensued from
the ICTR. Scholars have illustrated how, in other cases, international judges
have shown willingness to broaden the scope of legal constructs, through the
process of legal interpretation, to address the novel situations before them.50 In
this context, the ‘crime-driven lens’ has the merit of drawing attention to the
implications of such differing interpretations for the ensuing historical narra-
tives. As stated, however, this framework is unable to account for the differ-
ences in interpretations and approaches that different benches and/or
individual judges may decide to adopt.
Finally, it would be important not to overstate the flexibility of law’s ‘crime-
driven lens’ both in terms of its ability to develop new legal constructs and in
terms of its ability to accommodate competing interpretations. In the context of
ICL, fair trial principles such as those of legality and nullum crimen sine lege,
impose significant constraints on how far such innovations or adaptations may
go. There is a point where the formal categories of the law may not be able to
stretch sufficiently to accommodate the chaotic realities of armed conflict. At
that juncture, the formality of the law could have a significantly distorting
effect on the historical narratives written by judges.51 For instance, in the
1963 trial of the Auschwitz guards in Frankfurt, because the gravest offense
47 Wilson, supra note 1, at 176.
48 J. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, 24 Yale Journal of
International Law (1999) 421.
49 Of course, whether or not particular interpretations are viewed as exerting a ‘distortive’ or
‘corrective’ effect on historical facts will depend on one’s standpoint. For a critique of the broad
interpretation in Akayesu, see: W.A. Schabas, ‘Darfur and the ‘‘Odious Scourge’’: The
Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide’, 18 Leiden Journal of International Law (2005)
871, at 878.
50 Sander, supra note 43, at 4.
51 Bilsky, supra note 40, at 71.
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for which the defendants could be tried was murder as defined under national
criminal law, the prosecution often had to ‘torture history’ to show that the
behaviour of the defendants, who were involved in the administration and
operation of the Auschwitz concentration camp, satisfied the elements of mur-
der under national law.52
B. Constraints Relating to Scope
In addition to the constraints on interpretation, the ‘crime-driven lens’ is also
further constrained in its scope, potentially giving rise to blind spots in the
historical narratives that ICTs may write. Within a given armed conflict, trials
are only able to select and focus on the criminal acts that took place within the
ICTs’ temporal, territorial, personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. And even
within those specific jurisdictional limits, trials usually only ever cover a small
subset of the criminal activity falling within their jurisdiction depending, inter
alia, on the charges selected by the prosecutor and presented in the indict-
ments.53 The constraints as to scope may be characterized in terms of external
exclusions, referring to ‘the idea that only certain conflicts will be subjected to
international criminal law’ and internal exclusions, referring to the selectivity
involved with respect to ‘who within those conflicts is the subject of prosecu-
tion’.54 For various reasons, the prosecutor might choose to select and empha-
size a specific category of criminal activity and de-emphasize other conduct, with
consequences for the ensuing historical narratives.55 The merit of the ‘crime-
driven lens’ is to draw attention to the implications of such external and internal
exclusions for the historical narratives written by ICTs. This framework, how-
ever, is not able to explain the motivations for such exclusions.
Resource constraints and selectivity are part of the daily reality of ICTs and,
even though these limitations could give rise to critiques of partial justice,56
the fact is that ICTs were never meant, nor have the capacity, to prosecute
large numbers of perpetrators.57 Investigators and prosecutors working on
52 Douglas, supra note 25, at 189.
53 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1266.
54 C. Nielsen, ‘From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Civilizing Mission of International Criminal
Law’, 14 Auckland University Law Review (2008) 81, at 91–95.
55 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1265.
56 M.A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), at
153.
57 In spite of these limitations, writing in relation to the ICTY, Milanović considers that the
tribunal still made a positive net contribution, even if an imperfect one, as it was ‘exceptionally
unlikely that any of the high-ranking political and military leaders that have been tried by the
ICTY would ever have been (successfully) prosecuted before domestic courts’: see M. Milanovic,
‘The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Postmortem’, 110
American Journal of International Law (2016) 233, at 233. Moreover, some have argued that
by putting even a few prominent individuals on trial, courts may do for society at large ‘what
psychoanalysis does for individuals’: Osiel, supra note 7, at 173. Finally, Douglas points out that
the individuals selected for prosecution, even if only a few, should not be regarded as ‘scape-
goats’: see Douglas, supra note 25, at 518.
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conflict-related atrocities are generally confronted with an overwhelming vol-
ume of criminality to address, combined with considerable resource constraints
and the ever-intensifying need to reduce the size and length of investigations
and prosecutions.58 As a result, Jarvis notes that ‘tough choices constantly
have to be made about where priorities should lie and prosecutorial discretion
takes on unique dimensions.’59 An element of chance may also come into play
with respect to whether or not aspects of the criminal activity would be
uncovered in time to be included in the charges. For instance, in relation to
Nuremberg, Bloxham notes that ‘[t]he hand of fortune was clearly at work in
deciding that the records of the German Foreign Office would be found in
Marburg Castle, or that the correspondence of Alfred Rosenberg would be
discovered behind a false wall, in time for their incorporation in the IMT
trial’.60 These constraints mean, therefore, that ICTs may only ever get to
focus on a limited subset of crimes that occur in situations of mass atrocity,
and this, in turn, may give rise to significant blind spots in the historical
narratives they write.
The stark truth is, unfortunately, that many victims may never have their
day in court or indeed be ever accounted for in the history books. Writing in
relation to the African continent, Kapuscinski poignantly observes that ‘[m]any
wars in Africa are waged without witnesses, secretively, in unreachable places,
in silence, without the world’s knowledge, or even the slightest attention’.61 In
his expert testimony in Lubanga, Garretón, further noted that ‘[w]hat is so
painful in Africa is the magnitude of the figures involved. So many people
died. There are no names, no identification of the victims, and yet the figures
are always debatable’.62 Comparable observations may be made about victims
of conflicts, particularly those of ‘new wars’,63 in other parts of the world.64
58 To undertake such investigations, for instance, the Office of the Prosecution at the ICTY had a
Leadership Research Team and a Military Analyst Team, consisting mostly of non-legal experts
and researchers who provided information and expertise on historical, political, and military
topics for prosecution trial teams, that were made up mostly of police investigators and lawyers:
see Tromp, supra note 5, at ix.
59 M. Jarvis and K. Vigneswaran, ‘Challenges to Successful Outcomes in Sexual Violence Cases’, in
S. Brammertz and M. Jarvis (eds), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Oxford University
Press, 2016) 33.
60 Bloxham, supra note 19, at 58.
61 R. Kapuscinski, The Shadow of the Sun: My African Life, transl. K. Glowczewska (Penguin, 2002),
at 172.
62 Transcript, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-193-ENG ET WT 17-06-2009 1/96 SZ T (ICC)),
17 June 2009, at 27 (§§ 11–4).
63 J. Freedman, Gender, Violence and Politics in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Routledge, 2015),
at 39.
64 For instance, in its investigation of the long-running conflict between the Government of Sri
Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the UN Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka found credible allegations, which if proven, indicate that ‘a wide
range of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law was committed both by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, some of which would
amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. . . . Specifically, the Panel found credible
allegations associated with the final stages of the war. Between September 2008 and 19 May
2009, the Sri Lanka Army advanced its military campaign into the Vanni using large-scale and
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These sobering views should serve to contain any vaunted ambitions about the
scope of historical narratives of armed conflicts that ICTs, or indeed other
writers of history, may be able to write.
The conduct that is charged before ICTs will require the introduction of a
‘point of view’ with respect to locating the beginning and end of the relevant
historical contexts. There are no consensual criteria for locating the beginning
and end of such historical contexts. In historiography, as Shklar notes, there is
no general rule which can determine ‘the cut-off point for the historian’s
search for causes . . .’.65 Indeed, historians readily concede that these temporal
resting points ‘do not flow from the events but are in fact strategic ruptures
chosen for specific purposes’.66 The choice of such ruptures — of where to
begin the narrative and where to end it — is of immense strategic importance
as it could determine who will play the villain, who the victim.67 While in law,
the bounds of temporal jurisdiction define the span of time over which a given
court or tribunal has jurisdiction, competing views on the objectives of crim-
inal trials may induce varying starting and ending points with respect to the
historical contexts and evidence deemed relevant. Shklar argues that those
who wish to emphasize rehabilitation will wish to go far back into the root
causes of conflict. Conversely, those who are interested:
in simply ridding society of dangerous deviants as quickly and efficiently as possible will be
apt to stop very early. For them the ‘but for,’ sine qua non test will be all that needs to be
proved. Those lawyers whose eyes are fixed on deterrence and on maintaining the principle
of legality in criminal cases will want, in addition, proof of mens rea, amplified by a variety
of conditional considerations which ensure that the agent causing the prohibited result did
so in a truly voluntary, direct, and premeditated way. In all these cases the purpose of
causal inquiry, the fixing of responsibility, and subsequent punishment will determine the
scope and remoteness of the causes considered.68
There is no consensus, therefore, amongst lawyers about the proximity or
remoteness of the causes that they must examine in order to address criminal
responsibility. When in early 2006, Geoffrey Nice consulted his prosecution team
on the prosecution’s closing arguments in the Milošević trial, he recommended
beginning with the Field of Blackbirds in Kosovo in 1389 and tracing the
widespread shelling, causing large numbers of civilian deaths’: see ‘Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ (2011), available online at http://
www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (visited 7 March 2019), at ii; J.
Reynolds and S. Xavier, ‘‘‘The Dark Corners of the World’’: TWAIL and International Criminal
Justice’, 14 JICJ (2016) 959, at 960.
65 Shklar, supra note 44, at 197.
66 K. Cmiel, ‘After Objectivity: What Comes Next in History?’ 2 American Literary History (1990)
170, at 172.
67 Osiel argues that the victims and villains in the narrative told by the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East would have appeared different had the story ended somewhat later
than the prosecution preferred, ‘not with Allied victory at Okinawa, but with the nuclear
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at a time when all but the final details of Japanese
surrender had been resolved’: see Osiel, supra note 7, at 133.
68 Shklar, supra note 44, at 197.






/jicj/article/18/3/543/5900361 by guest on 11 February 2021
connections through the following six hundred years until the crimes of Slobodan
Milošević. Wilson notes that some applauded this approach, while others were
uncomfortable with the historical context extending so far back.69 While in some
cases, judges of ICTs have been willing to hear historical evidence dating from
outside the indictment period, for background and historical context,70 when
handling vast quantities of evidence in other cases, they have declined to admit
such evidence, citing its marginal relevance to the crimes charged.71
In addition to locating the beginning and end of the relevant historical con-
texts, prosecutorial discretion will further limit the scope of the ‘crime-driven
lens’ through the way the charges are framed by the prosecution.72 The primary
objective of prosecutors is not to write history, even though they might well
have a strong belief in the historical importance of their case.73 The primary
objective of the prosecutor is ‘to select the charges, incidents and modes of
liability which most accurately reflect the facts arising from the material col-
lected, and to select from that material only those items which will most con-
cisely and compellingly prove those facts’.74 Indeed, prosecutors who try to use
the indictment as a tool for history-writing may encounter active resistance from
the bench. In some cases, international judges have invited prosecutors to re-
duce the number of counts charged in the indictment and have actively dis-
suaded them from seeking to perform history-writing functions. In Stanisić et al.,
for instance, the ICTY pre-trial judge requested that the content of indictment be
limited in order to shorten the length of proceedings:
a final argument, the Prosecution submits that reducing the scope of the Indictment would
risk the creation of an inaccurate historical record. It argues that ‘[t]he loss of the Slobodan
Milosevic Judgement left an inevitable void in terms of the historical record of the scope of
the atrocities committed by Milosevic and his co-perpetrators’ and that ‘the Tribunal is now
faced with the opportunity . . . to create a permanent historical record of these atrocities and
to bring justice to the victims of these heinous crimes.’ In this regard, it also submits that a
further reduction of the Indictment ‘would result in a historically and factually inaccurate
record, and a loss of possibly the last opportunity the Tribunal has to achieve one of its core
goals . . .—to bring effective redress to the victims of international humanitarian law vio-
lations.’ However, the Tribunal was established to administer justice, and not to create a historical
record. The Trial Chamber will therefore not consider this argument as relevant for a deci-
sion to be taken pursuant to Rule 73 bis(D).75
69 Cited in Wilson, supra note 1, at 108. See also T. Hunt, ‘Whose Truth? Objective Truth and a
Challenge for History’, in W. Schabas and S. Darcy (eds), Truth Commissions and Courts: The
Tension Between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth (Springer Netherlands, 2004), at 195.
70 R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 210.
71 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1266.
72 Ibid., 1264.
73 For instance, Jarvis observes that, in developing legal approaches to prosecute sexual crimes,
the ICTY prosecution ‘clearly understood the historical importance of [its] mandate to prosecute
sexual violence crimes’: see Jarvis, supra note 42, at 9.
74 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1271.
75 Decision Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D), Stanisić et al. (ICTY IT-03-69-PT), Trial Chamber, 4
February 2008, § 21 (emphasis added). See also Milutinović, where the Trial Chamber focused
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The assertion by the judge that the Tribunal was established to administer
justice, and not to create a historical record, reflects the fact that there appears
to be no consensus regarding ‘the precise extent either of the ‘‘truth’’ or of the
‘‘historical record’’ that international trials are expected to produce’.76 While
in Stanisić et al., the pre-trial judge de-emphasized the history-writing function
of the ICTY, in other cases, such as Sikirica et al., the judges of the ICTY
Tribunal affirmed that the truth-finding function was one of the ‘fundamental
objectives of the International Tribunal’.77 This lack of consensus on the
proper place of history-writing in international criminal adjudication is shared
by prosecutors and other legal practitioners. Eltringham notes that ‘[l]egal
practitioners . . . are exercised by the question of whether their endeavour
should seek to intentionally create an ‘‘historical record’’’.78 In a series of
interviews with prosecution counsel that the author conducted at the ICTR,
he found that prosecutors acknowledged the divergence of views on this
matter:
[A] As regards history, even at the level of the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] there are
different views. Some people believe that prosecution is intended to create an historical
record. Others say that the prosecution should only be concerned with the particular
case at hand, with the guilt of that particular person. For me, I’m concerned with proving
the case, not establishing history.
[B] There’s a divergence among prosecutors. Some want an ‘historical record’. I believe it’s
a court, this was my view when I arrived and I’m still in that camp. But I recognize that
part of the legacy is to have some account, but it’s more of an incidental result than the
primary purpose. The other camp get off track of trying someone, to prove something, and
the trial mushrooms rather than focusing on the guilt or innocence of the accused.79
The above reflects both the fact that there is no consensus over the proper
place of history-writing in international criminal adjudication and the reality
that, at best, the truth-seeking function is but one of a number of competing
priorities within the prosecutorial strategy. As noted, investigators and prose-
cutors constantly have to make tough choices about what crimes to prioritize
and in what way.80 Where the history-writing priority ranks in this equation
may depend on, inter alia, the particular approaches of the prosecutorial team.
on identifying and eliminating ‘those crime sites or incidents that are clearly different from the
fundamental nature or theme of the case’: Decision on application of Rule 73 bis, Milutinović
et al. (IT-05-87-T), 11 July 2006, § 10; and Seselj, where the Trial Chamber focused on
identifying the crime sites or incidents that are ‘reasonably representative of the crimes
charged’: Decision on the application of Rule 73 bis, Šešelj (IT-03-67-PT), 8 November
2006, § 12.
76 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1257.
77 Sentencing Judgment, Sikirica et al. (IT-95-8-S 70), 13 November 2001, § 149.
78 N. Eltringham, ‘‘‘We Are Not a Truth Commission’’: Fragmented Narratives and the Historical
Record at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 11 Journal of Genocide Research
(2009) 55, at 55.
79 Ibid., at 58.
80 See D. Rogers, Law, Politics and the Limits of Prosecuting Mass Atrocity (Palgrave Macmillan,
2017), at 62.
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In this regard, it is possible to discern three broad and overlapping approaches
to the ways in which prosecutors may select and frame the charges: (i) focused
charges; (ii) comprehensive charges; and (iii) representative charges. Each of
these may have important implications for the ensuing historical narratives.
At one end of the spectrum, the prosecutor may seek to bring narrow,
‘focused’ charges, as was the case in Lubanga, where the indictment focused
on the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers, but omitted other
categories of criminal conduct, such as sexual offences.81 While this approach
has the merit of tending to promote expeditious trials (though this may not
always be the case),82 by excluding significant categories of conduct, it may
come in for significant criticism. For instance, human rights groups extensively
criticized the ICC Office of the Prosecutor in Lubanga for failing to accurately
characterize the scope of the conflict by not including sexual violence charges
in the indictment against Lubanga, despite allegations that girls had been
kidnapped into Lubanga’s militia and were often raped and/or kept as sex
slaves. From the perspective of history-writing, therefore, focused charges
risk giving rise to significant blind spots with respect to the true scope and
extent of criminal conduct. Interestingly, the ICTY prosecution was initially
going to go down the path of focused charges with respect to the genocide in
Srebrenica in July 1995. In this context, Jarvis notes that: ‘Initially, faced with
the twin realities of overwhelming crimes and limited resources, the OTP
proposed to prosecute the Srebrenica killings to the exclusion of the crimes
committed against the women, children and elderly who were expelled.’83
However, that proposal was ultimately reversed and charges for both exter-
minations of the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men and deportations of the
women, children and elderly people were brought.84 Prosecuting only the
killings/exterminations would have meant not just failing to accurately address
the crimes directed at the women, children and elderly persons, but it would
have also obscured the broader reality of the genocide in Srebrenica. This in
turn would have given rise to significant blind spots in the Tribunal’s narra-
tives about the genocide. Despite the inherent risks of a focused approach to
charging, some judges have actively advocated for this approach, as it pro-
motes more expeditious trials. For instance, Judge Kwon argued that: ‘the most
effective measure for tackling the problem of lengthy trials would be to limit
the number of charges in the indictment themselves. With a more focused
indictment, the production and analysis of crime-base and linkage evidence
81 ‘The ICC Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Legal Characterization of the Facts in Prosecutor v.
Lubanga - Vol. 14, Issue: 1’, ASIL Insights, 8 January 2010, available online at insights/
volume/14/issue/1/icc-appeals-chamber-judgment-legal-characterization-facts-prosecutor-v (vis-
ited 14 March 2020).
82 Judge Kwon notes that even cases involving accused charged with relatively few crimes com-
mitted in a relatively confined geographical area may result in lengthy trials: see O.G. Kwon,
‘The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen from the Bench’, 5 JICJ (2007) 360,
at 362.
83 Jarvis, supra note 42, at 14–15.
84 Krstić, supra note 34, § 1.
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would be a much speedier process than it currently is in the majority of the
cases at the Tribunal.’85
This argument, while placing emphasis on expeditious trials, tends to over-
look the implications for the ensuing historical narratives. Indeed, Judge Kwon
was critical of the reasons for which the ICTY prosecutor and her staff
appeared to be unwilling, in some instances, to voluntarily reduce the number
of charges in their indictments at the ICTY. He noted, inter alia, that: ‘[T]he
Prosecutor and many human-rights groups seem to believe that it is one of the
Tribunal’s main duties to . . . compile a complete historical record of the war
and determine the truth of what actually happened, both of which would
ostensibly require trial to proceed on charges that are as comprehensive as
possible.’86
Judge Kwon was not persuaded by that view. From his perspective, rather,
‘the paramount role of the judges of the Tribunal is to adjudicate, in as fair and
expeditious a manner as possible, the guilt or innocence of the accused before
them’.87 This position calls back the tension that exists between the competing
priorities that ICTs seek to address. In this case, Judge Kwon sought to resolve
that tension by emphasizing the aim of expeditious trials over the aim of truth-
seeking and, consequently, by promoting a more focused approach to charging
rather than one which promoted broader, more comprehensive charges. While
his reasons for doing so may be understandable, particularly in light of pres-
sures from the completion strategy, this approach does come at a cost with
respect to the ensuing historical narratives as it is more likely to give rise to
blind spots.
At the other end of the spectrum, the prosecutor may seek to bring ‘com-
prehensive’ charges, as was the case in Milošević, which included 66 counts in
the indictments, allegedly committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Kosovo, over a period of nine years.88 This approach, particularly when it
involves high-level accused, may include many different forms of responsibility
with larger and more sprawling crime bases. This approach tends to appear
attractive from the perspective of history-writing, as it aspires towards a
broader, inclusive account of the criminal conduct. However, it tends to in-
crease the length and complexity of trials as the parties seek to introduce large
quantities of evidence and counter-evidence to challenge the competing his-
torical claims.89 As Surroi, notes, for instance, ‘for Milošević, what was hap-
pening was not a trial; it was a panel on history . . ., in which his role would
be defined as the guardian of the Serbian historic truth’.90 It is submitted that,
given the formal and rule-bound nature of criminal trials, together with their
85 Kwon, supra note 82, at 372–373.
86 Ibid., at 373.
87 Ibid., at 374.
88 Tromp, supra note 5, at 11.
89 Kwon, supra note 82, at 373.
90 V. Surroi, ‘Conversations with Milošević – Two Meetings, Bloody Hands’, in T. Waters (ed.), The
Milosevic Trial: An Autopsy (Oxford University Press, 2014), at 225–226.
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various competing priorities,91 criminal trials may be not be best placed to
attempt such comprehensive accounts of conflicts.92 Indeed, Cryer notes that
‘[c]are must be taken that creating an accurate record of particular offences
does not spill over into an attempt to write the whole history of a conflict’.93
Or, as Wilson puts it, ‘[t]he writing of a far-reaching history is more adequately
achieved elsewhere, and chiefly by historians, social scientists, and others who
may, of course, draw on the extensive information and documentation
revealed in international trials’.94
In some cases, prosecutors concerned with the history-writing function of
ICTs have tried to bridge the gap by charging ‘representative’ crimes. Indeed,
such an approach is envisaged by the legal frameworks of some ICTs. As will
be discussed, however, it is not without its challenges. For instance, Rule 73
bis(D) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides:
[a]fter having heard the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber, in the interest of a fair and exped-
itious trial, may invite the Prosecutor to reduce the number of counts charged in the indict-
ment and may fix a number of crime sites or incidents comprised in one or more of the
charges in respect of which evidence may be presented by the Prosecutor which, having
regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the crimes charged in the indictment, their
classification and nature, the places where they are alleged to have been committed, their
scale and the victims of the crimes, are reasonably representative of the crimes charged.95
In Milutinović, for instance, the Trial Chamber invoked this rule to promote a
more streamlined indictment, by identifying and eliminating ‘those crime sites
or incidents that are clearly different from the fundamental nature or theme of
the case.’96 The Chamber recommended a removal of three sites, holding that
‘the case the Prosecution seeks to establish . . . will be adequately presented
even if evidence in relation to [the three removed] sites is not led, and that
focusing the trial on the remaining charges will improve the expeditiousness of
the proceedings while ensuring that they remain fair’.97 Similarly, in Šešelj, the
Trial Chamber used this rule to remove five counts and several crime sites from
the indictment, finding that the remaining crime sites or incidents were ‘rea-
sonably representative of the crimes charged’.98 In a similar vein, in the 2009–
2012 Prosecutorial Strategy of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, it was
held that: ‘[w]hile the Office’s mandate does not include production of
91 In this context, Damaška recalls that while truth-seeking is an important objective of criminal
trials, it quite obviously ‘cannot be an overriding consideration in legal proceedings: it is gen-
erally recognized that several social needs and values exercise a constraining effect on attempts
to achieve fact-finding precision’: see Damaška, supra note 18, at 301.
92 Kwon, supra note 82, at 373.
93 R. Cryer, ‘Witness Evidence before the International Criminal Tribunals’, 2 Law and Practice of
International Courts and Tribunals (2003) 411, at 418.
94 Wilson, supra note 2, at 17.
95 Rule 73 bis(D) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure (emphasis added).
96 Decision on application of Rule 73 bis, Milutinović et al. (IT-05-87-T), Trial Chamber, 11 July
2006, § 10.
97 Ibid., § 12.
98 Decision on the application of Rule 73 bis, Šešelj (IT-03-67-PT), Trial Chamber, 8 November
2006, § 14.
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comprehensive historical records for a given conflict, incidents are selected to
provide a sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and the main types
of victimization’.99
Representative charges are intended to bridge the gap between more focused
and more comprehensive charges and, from the perspective of truth-seeking,
would appear appealing, in light of the various constraints on ICTs. On the one
hand, representative charges aim to include crime sites and incidents that may
be considered representative of a broader genus of crimes, while keeping the
number of charges within manageable limits, and thus avoiding some of the
pitfalls of both focused and comprehensive charging. On the other hand, how-
ever, the faith in ‘representative’ crimes, and the consequent reductions in the
crime sites or incidents in the indictments, may give rise to an important
philosophical question about representation: that is, whether any crimes can
be considered sufficiently ‘representative’ of the broader atrocities that occur in
armed conflict.
Bloxham addresses this question in relation to the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the Holocaust. He notes that, even at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson and others
wanted to avoid focusing on ‘individual barbarities and perversions which may
have occurred independently of any central plan.’100 Rather, the trial staff
requested of the governments of nine United Nations countries that they fur-
nish ‘three examples of war crimes or violations of international law to be used
in the prosecution of the leading Nazis’.101 However, in practice, it was im-
possible to say what was or was not ‘typical’, or even if ‘types’ as such did exist
within groupings of diverse Nazi institutions and practices such as the camp
system. As a result of this approach to charging representative crimes, the
names of two camps — Belzec and Sobibor — were entirely absent from the
judgement. These camps, together with Treblinka, had particular significance
when considering the historical representation of the Holocaust as a whole.
They were an integral part of what came to be known as Aktion Reinhard, a
larger scheme of murdering and expropriating the Jews.102 Bloxham argues
that the absence of these camps from the post-war trials, which was in part a
function of the faith in ‘representative’ examples, had far-reaching implications
for popular appreciation of the Jewish fate, as well as the historical narratives
that emerged from Nuremberg. The approach of charging representative
crimes, therefore, also carries some risks for creating blind spots in the narra-
tives of ICTs. It raises the questions of which crimes may be construed as
‘representative’ and who decides and how? In practice, the selection of repre-
sentative crimes, as seen in Nuremberg, may further limit the scope of events
about which ICTs write historical narratives.
The ‘crime-driven lens’ is helpful in drawing attention to the implications of
these approaches to charging for the historical narratives of ICTs. The decision
99 ICC, The Office of The Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy: 2009–2012’, 1 February 2010, § 20.
100 Bloxham, supra note 20, at 62.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., at 109.
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of whether to bring ‘focused,’ ‘comprehensive’ or ‘representative’ charges will
however be contingent on several factors, only some of which may be related
to considerations of history-writing. In the first instance, the decision will be
directly related to the availability of evidence. However, here again, the avail-
ability of evidence may itself, in turn, be influenced by the attitudes of the
investigators and prosecutors to the proper place of history-writing. Some ex-
ICC investigators have suggested, for instance, that not enough analysis and
resources had been invested ahead of investigative missions to uncover and
bring to light a more accurate account of human rights abuses in Uganda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. As a result, the most appropriate
charges may not always have been brought against suspected perpetrators of
atrocities.103
Another critical consideration for the prosecutor when selecting and framing
the charges will be the very high probative threshold of ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’. A trial chamber will only convict if it ‘is satisfied of the criminal re-
sponsibility of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of the entir-
ety of the evidence admitted’.104 This standard is significantly higher than the
broader ‘frame of probabilities’ usually used by historians.105 Indeed, Evans
notes that ‘historians may find it difficult to argue that their conclusions put
any matter with which they deal ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt,’’ as is required in
the criminal law before a conviction can be reached’.106 The criminal law
standard, of course, has the advantage of establishing ‘a historical record at
the highest legal standard of certainty’.107 Indeed, often criminal trials lead to
the accrual of a great deal of evidence in order to prove ‘the obvious’. This
potentially gives rise to greater accuracy of the historical narratives, as each
allegation against the accused would need to be established, including that the
crime actually occurred and that accused was criminally responsible for it.108
However, this entails also considerable potential risks for the ensuing histor-
ical narrative in the case of acquittals on account of the high standard not
having been met. This is due to the error distribution doctrine that underlies
criminal procedure and stacks the results in such a way as ‘to ensure that
such errors as do occur will be predominantly false acquittals rather than false
convictions.’109 For instance, in September 2011, an ICTY Trial Chamber
convicted the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Momčilo
Perišić, to 27 years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting crimes in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica committed by Bosnian Serbs, and on the basis of
103 K. Glassborow, ‘Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire’,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, available online at https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-
investigative-strategy-under-fire (visited 14 March 2020).
104 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1272.
105 Wilson, supra note 1, at 6.
106 R.J. Evans, ‘History, Memory, and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness’, 41 History and
Theory (2002) 326, at 330.
107 R.G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2002), at 73.
108 Tromp, supra note 5, at 22.
109 L. Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology (Cambridge
University Press, 2006), at 29.
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superior responsibility for crimes in Croatia committed by Croatian Serbs.110
However, on appeal, Perišić was acquitted of all of these charges, by a majority
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, who found that both the aiding and abetting
charges, and the superior responsibility charges had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.111 This acquittal was described by one observer as ‘unfor-
tunate’ in view of its impact on ‘the solidification of official narratives of the
warring parties in the former Yugoslavia’.112 In particular, the acquittal was
presented by the Serbian government ‘as some kind of general exoneration of
Serbia as a state for its involvement in mass atrocities in Bosnia and
Croatia.’113 It may be argued that a conscientious historian, analysing the
same evidence, might well have reached different conclusions with respect to
Perišić’s responsibility in this matter.114
Criminal law espouses the maxim, which may be traced back to Roman law,
that ‘it is better for a guilty person to go unpunished than for an innocent one
to be condemned’.115 Drawing on his experience in a domestic court, Judge
Frankel observes ‘[w]hile we undoubtedly convict some innocent people, a
truth horrifying to confront, we also acquit a far larger number who are guilty,
a fact we bear with much more equanimity’.116 Although Lord Bonomy
reminds that a court judgment of acquittal in a criminal case does not neces-
sarily mean that an accused is ‘innocent’,117 the truth is that an acquittal of a
potentially guilty individual for want of evidence may have far-reaching impli-
cations for the ensuing historical narratives of the conflict. Osiel notes that:
‘[w]hen political leaders are acquitted in a criminal proceeding, they choose
(unsurprisingly) to interpret this legal result as a complete vindication of their
story. Their claims to this effect, in tum, are widely disseminated throughout
society by the mass media.’118
A judgment of acquittal by a given court or tribunal may be perceived
(erroneously) as equivalent to a judgment of innocence. As stated, this may
have significant implications for the legal and historical narratives that en-
sue.119 In view of this, when faced with evidence which may not meet the
110 Trial Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, § 1840.
111 Appeals Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-A), Appeals Judgment, 28 February 2013, § 122.
112 M. Milanović, ‘The Limits of Aiding and Abetting Liability: The ICTY Appeals Chamber
Acquits Momcilo Perisic’, EJIL:Talk!, 11 May 2013, available online at https://www.ejiltalk.
org/the-limits-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-chamber-acquits-momcilo-peri
sic/ (visited 14 March 2020).
113 Ibid.
114 Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1272.
115 G. Williams, The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal Trial (Stevens & Sons Limited,
1955), at 130. For variations of this maxim, see Laudan, supra note 109, at 63.
116 M.E. Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View’, 123 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review (1975) 1031, at 1037.
117 Cited in N. Tromp, ‘In Search for Truth at Mass Atrocities Trials: Will Judges and Lawyers
Have the Last Word?’ 12 The Journal of Comparative Law (2018) 61, at 73.
118 Osiel, supra note 7, at 105.
119 Tromp, supra note 5, at 10. Indeed, Damaška argues that, in order to avoid such mispercep-
tions, a third type of verdict may be appropriate: ‘[w]hile convictions are expected to accur-
ately determine the factual predicates of criminal liability, acquittals are not meant to do the
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required threshold, a prosecutor may prefer not to charge particular conduct in
the first place.120 After all, in convicting a killer, the law does not need to
prove that he committed a thousand murders if it can prove he committed a
hundred. As Evans notes, however, this approach may ‘fail to satisfy the wider
remit of history’.121 It serves to restrict the number of crimes charged in the
indictment and, consequently, to further limit the scope of the historical nar-
ratives that ICTs may produce.
There are several other factors that exert constraints on the formulation of
the indictment and, as a result, the scope of the ‘crime-driven lens’ in inter-
national criminal trials.122 In the final analysis, in the context of adversarial
proceedings, the ultimate goal of trial lawyers is to win the case at hand and
not necessarily to produce accurate and sincere historical narratives.123 As
such, lawyers will generally tend to prefer versions of history that support
that outcome, even if they may contain significant historical blind spots.
That ultimate goal will inform every aspect of the prosecutorial process, includ-
ing the formulation of the indictment and the charges brought. In his assess-
ment of that process, Wilson notes that ‘what we see are legally motivated
strategies from both prosecution and defense that distort the record . . .’124 or,
at least, that may degrade the quality of historical evidence. The fact is that,
even for prosecutors who are firmly committed to the history-writing role of
ICTs, this commitment will always have to be subordinate to the demands of
that ultimate goal.
3. Conclusion
In his assessment of the link between judging international crimes and writing
a history of armed conflicts, Wilson reflects that both are complex endeavours
and their relationship to one another ‘cannot be characterized by either
same for the factual predicates of innocence. If we wanted to increase the truth-value of
acquittals, we would have to adopt a third type of verdict — a type capable of expressing a
range of belief-states between the conviction that the accused is guilty and the finding that he
is innocent. Acquittals could then be reserved for cases in which factfinders are convinced of
the accused’s innocence’: Damaška, supra note 18, at 305.
120 Alvarez, supra note 48, at 429.
121 Evans, supra note 106, at 330.
122 These include both internal and external factors. With respect to internal factors, for instance,
one mechanism which has been extensively scrutinized is the plea bargaining procedure
which, while saving precious resources, may produce partial historical narratives: see
Schabas, supra note 14, at 164; Gaynor, supra note 4, at 1268. With respect to external
constraints, several scholars have written about the political constraints which are exerted in
subtle and not-so-subtle ways on prosecutors when formulating indictments: see Rogers, supra
note 80, at 142, 145; and Cryer, supra note 70, at 220.
123 The theme of accurate and sincere history-writing, in the context of the concept of responsible
history, is developed further in A. Zammit Borda, The Historical Narratives of International
Criminal Tribunals and Their Blind Spots: Building a Responsible History Framework (Springer/
TMC Asser, forthcoming).
124 Wilson, supra note 1, at 168.
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harmonious accord or inherent contradiction’.125 Arguably, this relationship
continues to be a source of controversy for judges and other legal practitioners
today, and there is no consensus over the proper place of history-writing in the
context of international criminal adjudication. While some judges prefer to de-
emphasize their history-writing role, the fact remains, however, that ICTs are
epistemic engines, that is, they are institutions that systematically and inevitably
produce knowledge or find truths about the conflicts that come before them.
The framework discussed is helpful in drawing attention to some of the
features of international criminal trials and their implications for the kinds of
knowledge that ICTs may produce and the historical narratives that they
write. The ‘crime-driven lens’ is characterized by two important constraints
relating to interpretation and scope, both of which may give rise to blind spots in
the narratives of ICTs. With respect to interpretation, ICTs perceive and inter-
pret past events through distinct legal constructs, which may be further broad-
ened or narrowed through judicial interpretation at trial. While these
constructs perform an important function in legal adjudication, they may ap-
pear artificial to outsiders and, at times, may have the effect of ‘torturing’ or
‘distorting’ history. Moreover, although such constructs are adaptable and, in
some cases, judges have shown willingness to construe them in ways that
bring them closer to ‘ordinary’ understandings of the terms, there is a limit
to the flexibility of the ‘crime-driven lens’ imposed by the principles of legality
and nullum crimen sine lege. While this framework is useful in focusing atten-
tion on competing interpretations for the ensuing historical narratives, it is not
able to explain why judges, in particular cases, may prefer particular interpre-
tations. Such preferences would have to be explained by reference to other
factors (such as theories of judicial decision-making).
Moreover, the ‘crime-driven lens’ is further constrained by scope to criminal
conduct that took place within the ICTs’ jurisdiction. Dimensions of a conflict
which are not related to criminal conduct and/or fall outside the jurisdiction of
a given ICT would not systematically be captured in the historical narratives
produced by such courts and tribunals. This would include events of unques-
tionable historical importance, such as legitimate combat not involving crimes,
peace negotiations and efforts to ensure humanitarian relief. And even with
respect to events falling within the jurisdictional limits of a given ICT, trials
usually only ever capture a small subset of criminal conduct, depending, inter
alia, on the charges selected by the prosecutor and presented in the indict-
ments. As discussed, various factors may influence the charges brought as well
as the location of the beginning and end of the relevant historical contexts. In
some cases, prosecutors concerned with the history-writing function have tried
to bridge the gap by charging representative crimes. However, the faith in
representative crimes, while intuitively appealing from the perspective of
history-writing, may also raise philosophical questions related to the nature
of representation and whether crimes can be considered sufficiently represen-
tative of the broader atrocities that occur in armed conflict. While the merit of
125 Ibid., at 13.
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the ‘crime-driven lens’ is to draw attention to the implications of these
approaches for the historical narratives written by ICTs, it is not an appropriate
framework for explaining the motivations behind particular charging styles.
As epistemic engines, ICTs have systematically produced important historical
accounts of the armed conflicts falling within their purview,126 and their judg-
ments have included significant debates about the historical dimensions of
such conflicts that ‘have gone much beyond the specifics of the charges
against any particular individuals accused’.127 While the important contribu-
tions of ICTs to enhancing understanding of the histories of conflicts should
therefore not be underestimated, the significant constraints of the ‘crime-driven
lens’ through which ICTs perceive and interpret past events, and its potential
for blind spots, have to be taken into account when considering the historical
legacies of ICTs.
126 Ibid., at 18.
127 Schabas, supra note 14, at 158.
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